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Placing the Ball in Congress' Court: A Critical
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decision in Arlington
Central School District Board Of Education v. Murphy,
126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006)
By Ashlie D'Errico Surur *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")
focuses on providing a fair and appropriate public education (also
known as a "FAPE") to all individuals with disabilities.' With its
enactment of the special education legislation, Congress anticipated
that disputes would arise between school districts and parents with
respect to a child's right to a FAPE.2 Congress also believed school
districts would have a "natural advantage" over the parents of a
disabled child.3 Thus, to ensure meaningful parental participation
and accurate resolutions of disputes, Congress created procedural
safeguards.4 The goal was to create an even playing field where
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.S. 2005,
University of the Pacific, in Mathematics and English. I am very grateful to
Professor Richard Peterson, Director of Pepperdine School of Law's Special
Education Advocacy Clinic, for his inspirational seminar and continued
mentorship. I also want to thank Professor Steven Schultz for helping me become
the best legal researcher and writer possible. Finally, I want to thank my husband,
Emmir, my mother, Morgan, and my sisters, Angela, Aimee, and Abbie, for their
constant love, guidance, and inspiration.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2006).
2. See Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ., 471
U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
3. Id
4. Id. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq., for a list of the procedural
safeguards in the IDEA.
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parents could meaningfully participate in the development of their
child's education and could also challenge inappropriate decisions
rendered by school districts. 5
Then, on June 26, 2006, the Supreme Court handed down a major
decision regarding the procedural safeguards mandated by the IDEA.
In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy6,
the Court held that prevailing parents could not recover expert fees as
part of their litigation costs.7 The decision was rendered in light of a
jurisdictional split on whether the term "costs" as laid down in 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) included expert fees.8 The Arlington decision
came in the wake of another significant special education law case.
In Schaffer v. Weast,9 the Supreme Court held that the burden of
proof' ° in an administrative hearing challenging an individualized
education program ("IEP") is placed upon the party seeking relief."
Viewed in light of one another, these decisions create entirely new
problems for the parents of children with disabilities. These
decisions not only impact the nature of the IDEA's procedural
safeguards, but also have the potential to diminish a parent's ability
to effectively challenge a school district's decisions. In the wake of
Schaffer, more than ever, experts are necessary in IDEA litigation.' 2
Yet, as a result of Arlington, the cost of obtaining an expert just
might be too much for some parents to bear.
This case note provides an analysis of the Court's decision in
Arlington and its impact on the future of special education law and
those individuals involved in it. Part II of this article is devoted to
the historical background of special education law and the Spending
Clause of the United States Constitution. Part III sets forth the
substantive and procedural facts of Arlington. Then in Part IV, this
article presents a critical analysis of the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Arlington. Part V deals with the potential legal
5. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455,
2470 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. 126 S. Ct. at 2455.
7. Id. at 2463.
8. Id. at 2458.
9. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
10. In this context the burden of proof refers to the burden of persuasion.
11. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53.
12. See Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2469 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
and social consequences of the decision. Finally, Part VI concludes
this article.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of Special Education Law in the United States
Disability is a natural part of the human experience
and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to
participate in or contribute to society. Improving
educational results for children with disabilities is an
essential element of our national policy of ensuring
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals
with disabilities.13
This quote is from the Congressional Findings section of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004
("IDEA 2004"). It provides a modem view of disability, a view that
did not come into effect until the latter part of the Twentieth century.
Until 1975, more than one million children were excluded from
school because of a disability.' 4 It was not until November 29, 1975,
when Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (Public Law 94-142) ("EAHCA"), that children with disabilities
were finally given full access to the public school system.' 5 Sadly,
exclusion from public schools is only part of the deep and shocking
history of special education in the United States. For the majority of
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, individuals with disabilities
were treated as subhuman.
1. Early Cases, Eugenics, Forced Sterilization, and Euthanasia in
the United States
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). This quote is taken from the Congressional
Findings sections of the IDEA 2004.
14. Id. § 1400(c)(1)(D), n.10.
15. Id.
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Several late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century cases are
indicative of society's substandard treatment of individuals with
disabilities. In 1893, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a
school had properly excluded a child from attending the school
because he "was too weak-minded to derive profit from
instruction."' 6 The court went on the hold that, "whether certain acts
of disorder so seriously interfere with the school that one who
persists in them, either voluntarily or by reason of imbecility, should
not be permitted to continue in the school, is a question which the
statute makes [the School Committee's] duty to answer."' 17 Thus,
according to the Watson court, the cause of the disruption was
immaterial.18 Rather, it was solely within the school's discretion to
decide whether or not to exclude the child from public school.' 9
However, the most revealing evidence of the court's and society's
feelings towards the disabled lies in the Watson court's explanation
of why it has chosen to label this child "weak-minded." This child is
given the label "weak-minded" because he is "troublesome to other
children, making unusual noises, pinching others, etc.," and because
he is "unable to take ordinary, decent, physical care of himself." 20
Surprisingly, these explanations have nothing to do with mental
capacity, but rather include only the physical attributes and outward
impressions of the child.
Later, in 1919, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a school's
exclusion of a thirteen-year-old cripple child named Merritt.2 1
Merritt had been crippled since birth.22 His paralysis affected his
entire physical and nervous system so that he did not have normal
control of his voice, hands, feet, and body.23 He had a high, rasping
tone of voice, and would make uncontrolled facial contortions.24 On
these facts the court made the following statement:
16. Watson v. Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864 (Mass. 1893).
17. Id. at 845.
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
21. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153 (Wis. 1919).
22. Id. at 153.
23. Id.
24. Id.
It is claimed, on the part of the school board, that his
physical condition and aliment produces a depressing
and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school
children; that by reason of his physical condition he
takes up an undue portion of the teachers time and
attention, distracts the attention of other pupils and
interferes generally with the discipline and progress of
the school.25
In the record there was no evidence that Merritt suffered from
mental retardation or that he was unable to learn. 26 The school's sole
reason for exclusion was that his physical appearance made everyone
depressed and nauseous.27
In 1914, just prior to the Beattie decision, the theory of Eugenics
was being taught at major universities in the United States including:
Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, Brown, Wisconsin, Northwestern,
Clark, and several others. 28  In 1869, English Psychologist Francis
Galton published his major work on Eugenics entitled, "Hereditary
Genius" which led to the belief that the incompetent and ailing were
a threat to society.29 As a result, eugenical sterilization laws were
passed in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. 30
Eugenical sterilization was aimed specifically at
those individuals in mental or penal institutions who,
from family pedigree analysis, were considered likely
to give birth to socially defective children.
Sterilization could be ordered at any time after a
patient had been examined by a eugenics committee,
usually composed of a lawyer or family member
representing the individual, a judge, and a doctor or
25. Id. at 154.
26. Id
27. Id
28. See generally Garland E. Allen, Science Misapplied: The Eugenics Age
Revisited, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Aug.-Sept. 1996, at 10-11 (discussing the history
of Eugenics in the United States).
29. Id
30. Id
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other eugenic 'expert.' In the end, more than 30 states
had enacted such compulsory sterilization laws by
1940. And between 1907 (when the first such law
was put into effect in Indiana) and 1941, more than
60,000 eugenical sterilizations were preformed in the
United States. 31
Even the Supreme Court of the United States believed in and
enforced the eugenical sterilization movement.32 In 1927, Carrie
Buck ("Carrie"), a twenty-one-year-old woman with epilepsy, who
refused to be forcibly sterilized, came before the United States
Supreme Court.33 Carrie has been committed to the Virginia State
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded ("the facility"), where he
mother was also an inmate.34  The facility sought enforcement
through the court system because Carrie refused sterilization. 35 The
Court upheld the facility's forced sterilization policy.36  In his
majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made the following
statement:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare
may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It
would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped
with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
31. Id. at 28.
32. See generally Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (holding a Virginia
forcible sterilization law constitutional).
33. See id at 205.
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id. at 208.
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cutting the Fallopian tubes .... Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.37
With this, Justice Holmes ordered twenty-one-year-old Carrie
sterilized against her will.38 Sadly, the widespread social and legal
maltreatment of individuals with disabilities did not end with Buck.
In 1942, the theory of Euthanasia swept the United States and
threatened the disabled community. 39 A United States psychiatrist
named Foster Kennedy published an editorial in the American
Journal of Psychiatry promoting the killing of "retarded" children
and the "utterly unfit., 4' Kennedy reasoned that euthanasia would
put these individuals out of their misery.4 1  Thus began the
Euthanasia movement in the United States. Shockingly, the only
thing capable of stopping this sweeping movement was the United
States' entrance into World War 11.42
2. The Civil Rights Movement and the Reformation of Special
Education
a). Brown v. Board of Education43 Inspires a Movement
Even though the Euthanasia movement had been interrupted by
the war,44 this old world view of disability continued well into the
Mid-Twentieth Century. The historical discrimination and animosity
towards individuals with disabilities continued uncontested until the
37. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. See generally Foster Kennedy, The Problem of Social Control of the
Congenital Defective: Education, Sterilization, Euthanasia, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY,




42. Richard Peterson, Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law,
Special Education Law Lecture (August 23, 2006) (lecture slides of Professor
Richard Peterson and author).
43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. Richard Peterson, Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law,
Special Education Law Lecture (August 23, 2006) (lecture slides of Professor
Richard Peterson and author).
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Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education.45 In
Brown, the Court held that segregation of white and colored students
was inherently unconstitutional and that "separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. '46 Inspired, civil rights advocates
became convinced that the Brown decision was a clear indication that
the exclusion and discrimination of children with disabilities was also
unconstitutional.47 Consider for a moment the following paraphrases
from the Brown decision:
To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their [disability]
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds
unlikely ever to be undone.48
Segregation of [disabled and typical] children in
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
[disabled] children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the
[disabled and typical children] is usually interpreted as
denoting inferiority of the [disabled] group. A sense
of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of [disabled] children and to deprive
them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
[typical and disabled] integrated school system.49
These paraphrases from Brown illustrate just how inspirational
the decision became to special education advocates and parents of
45. Tyce Palmaffy, The Evolution of the Federal Role, in RETHINKING
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 1, 3 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., Andrew J.
Rotherham & Chester R. Hokanson, Jr. eds., 2001).
46. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
47. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 3.
48. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
49. Id Disability language has been substituted for the segregation language
to illustrate how the holding and reasoning in Brown is applied to Special
Education Law. Typical children are defined as children without disabilities.
children with disabilities. In the wake of the Brown decision, parents
of children with disabilities brought suit against school districts
arguing that the districts' exclusion and segregation policies
unconstitutionally discriminated against their children because of
their disabilities.5" Concurrently, civil rights advocates argued that,
"schools were underestimating the benefits of placing disabled
children in the regular classroom. ' 5I They advocated for inclusion,
arguing the need for society to help create self-sufficient disabled
children.52 Advocates reasoned that in order to learn self-sufficiency,
disabled children needed to live amongst and interact with their
typical peers.53
States, on the other hand, were not so inspired and continued to
exclude children with disabilities from public schools.54  For
example, as late as 1969, North Carolina schools were allowed to
label students "uneducable" and could criminally punish any parent
who challenged the school's determination.55 On a milder level, yet
equally discriminatory, most other schools continued to place
disabled children in facilities56 separate from any of their typical
peers.57 School districts continued to believe that it was cheaper to
educate disabled children in separate facilities than to educate them
in a regular classroom.58
b). Early Federal Legislation: Congress' First Step in Special
Education Reform
Congress finally took action in 1965 when it enacted the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"). 59 The ESEA
50. PETER WRIGHT & PAMELA WRIGHT, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 13 (2d. ed.
2007).
51. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 4.
52. Id
53. Id.
54. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 4.
55. Id
56. These facilities could range anywhere from separate classrooms to
separate schools. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 4.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Wright, supra note 50, at 13.
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specifically dealt with underprivileged children's lack of educational
opportunity and sought to provide them with the resources that would
ensure they received equal access to an appropriate education.60 But,
Congress did not address the education of children with disabilities
until it amended the ESEA in 1966.61 With the amendment, the
ESEA established a "grant program to assist states in the 'initiation,
expansion, and improvement of programs and projects ...for the
education of handicapped children."'62  For the first time in the
United States, federal funding was established to educate disabled
children. 63 Later, in 1970, the ESEA was replaced by the Education
of the Handicapped Act ("EHA") 64 which consolidated several grants
for children with disabilities. 65 Like the ESEA, the EHA established
a grant program whose purpose was to encourage States to develop
educational programs and resources for individuals with
disabilities. 66 Unfortunately, the EHA did not mandate how funds
were to be used by states.67 As a result, the ESEA and the EHA both
failed to significantly improve the education received by children
with disabilities. 68
c). PARC69 & Mills70 : Special Education Advocates Score Their
First Victories in the Courts
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Back to School on Civil Rights, published by the National
Counsel on Disability (2000). URL:
www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/backtoschooll.htm (Retrieved on
October 11, 2006)).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 5.
64. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230.
65. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 5.
66. Wright, supra note 50, at 13 (quoting Back to School on Civil Rights,





69. See generally Pa. Ass'n. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (per curiam) [hereinafter PARC] (holding that since the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had undertaken the task of providing a free public
Unable to make any legitimate headway in the legislature
concerning the education of individuals with disabilities, special
education advocates turned to the courts.7' During the 1970s, two
major cases defined the rights of individuals with disabilities, set the
framework for future special education litigation,7 2 and became the
major catalyst for change in the education and treatment of the
disabled."
In PARC, the parents of mentally retarded children filed a class
action lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania arguing
that certain state statutes unconstitutionally 74 barred the mentally
retarded from public schools.75 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld a consent agreement
between the parties and in doing so established the principle that
when a state agrees to provide free public education to all its
children, it must also provide disabled children with equal access to
that same free public education. 76 Specifically, the court made the
following findings:
[T]hat all mentally retarded persons are capable of
benefiting from a program of education and training;
that the greatest number of retarded persons, given
such education and training, are capable of achieving
education to all of its children, it must also provide access to that same free public
education to its children with disabilities).
70. Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
71. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 4. Litigation was also sparked by the fear that
in the aftermath of the Brown decision, school districts would begin labeling black
children as mentally retarded in order to keep them out of schools. Palmaffy, supra
note 45, at 4.
72. Palmaff&, supra note 45, at 4.
73. Wright, supra note 50, at 13.
74. Parents argued that the statutes barring mentally retarded children from
public schools violated their equal protection and due process rights guaranteed to
them under the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued the statutes were
unconstitutional because they "arbitrarily exclud[ed] children from school without
any kind of hearing or legitimate reason for doing so." Palmaff&, supra note 45, at
4.
75. PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1258-59.
76. Id. at 1259.
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self-sufficiency, and the remaining few, with such
education and training, are capable of achieving some
degree of self-care; that the earlier such education and
training begins, the more thoroughly and the more
efficiently a mentally retarded person will benefit
from it; and, whether begun early or not, that a
mentally retarded person can benefit at any point in
his life and development from a program of education
and training.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has
undertaken to provide a free public education to all of
its children between the ages of six and twenty-one
years, and, even more specifically, has undertaken to
provide education and training for all of its
exceptional children.
Having undertaken to provide a free public
education to all of its children, including its
exceptional children, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded
child access to a free public program of education and
training.
It is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each
mentally retarded child in a free, public program of
education and training appropriate to the child's
capacity, within the context of a presumption that,
among the alternative programs of education and
training required by statute to be available, placement
in a regular public school class is preferable to
placement in a special public school class and
placement in a special public school class is preferable
to placement in any other type of program of
education and training.77
77. Id. at 1259-60. The order laid down by the court that "placement in a
regular public school class is preferable to placement in a special public school
class and placement in a special public school class is preferable to placement in
any other type of program of education and training" is now referred to as the
theory of least restrictive environment ("LRE"). PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1260.
The decision in PARC established two extremely influential ideas
that would greatly impact the future role of the federal government in
special education. First, the consent agreement approved by the court
outlined Pennsylvania's duty to provide equal access to public
education to children with disabilities. Second, it laid down certain
rules and procedures that were intended to protect the rights of
students with disabilities.7 8 Further, "[i]n the subsequent settlement,
it was agreed that educational placement decisions must include a
process of parental participation and a means to resolve disputes." 79
The other 1972 case, Mills v. Board of Education of District of
Columbia8 °, involved: (1) the District of Columbia's failure to
78. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 4.
79. Wright, supra note 50, at 13 (citing PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1258-59).
80. The plaintiffs in PARC included the following underprivileged children:
PETER MILLS is twelve years old, black, and a
committed dependent ward of the District of Columbia
resident at Junior Village. He was excluded from the
Brent Elementary School on March 23, 1971, at which
time he was in the fourth grade. Peter allegedly was a
'behavior problem' and was recommended and
approved for exclusion by the principal. Defendants
have not provided him with a full hearing or with a
timely and adequate review of his status. Furthermore,
Defendants have failed to provide for his reenrollment
in the District of Columbia Public Schools or enrollment
in private school. On information and belief, numerous
other dependent children of school attendance age at
Junior Village are denied a publicly-supported
education. Peter remains excluded from any publicly-
supported education.
DUANE BLACKSHEARE is thirteen years old,
black, resident at Saint Elizabeth's Hospital,
Washington, D.C., and a dependent committed child.
He was excluded from the Giddings Elementary School
in October, 1967, at which time he was in the third
grade. Duane allegedly was a "behavior problem."
Defendants have not provided him with a full hearing or
with a timely and adequate review of his status. Despite
repeated efforts by his mother, Duane remained largely
excluded from all publicly-supported education until
February, 1971. Education experts at the Child Study
Center examined Duane and found him to be capable of
returning to regular class if supportive services were
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provided. Following several articles in the Washington
Post and Washington Star, Duane was placed in a
regular seventh grade classroom on a two-hour a day
basis without any catch-up assistance and without an
evaluation or diagnostic interview of any kind. Duane
has remained on a waiting list for a tuition grant and is
now excluded from all publicly-supported education.
GEORGE LIDDELL, JR., is eight years old, black,
resident with his mother, Daisy Liddell. . . . George has
never attended public school because of the denial of his
application to the Maury Elementary School on the
ground that he required a special class. George
allegedly was retarded. Defendants have not provided
him with a full hearing or with a timely and adequate
review of his status. George remains excluded from all
publicly-supported education, despite a medical opinion
that he is capable of profiting from schooling, and
despite his mother's efforts to secure a tuition grant
from Defendants.
STEVEN GASTON is eight years old, black,
resident with his mother, Ina Gaston . . . and unable to
afford private instruction. He has been excluded from
the Taylor Elementary School since September, 1969, at
which time he was in the first grade. Steven allegedly
was slightly brain-damaged and hyperactive, and was
excluded because he wandered around the classroom.
Defendants have not provided him with a full hearing or
with a timely and adequate review of his status. Steven
was accepted in the Contemporary School, a private
school, provided that tuition was paid in full in advance.
Despite the efforts of his parents, Steven has remained
on a waiting list for the requisite tuition grant from
Defendant school system and excluded from all
publicly-supported education.
MICHAEL WILLIAMS is sixteen years old, black,
resident at Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington,
D.C., and unable to afford private instruction. Michael
is epileptic and allegedly slightly retarded. He has been
excluded from the Sharpe Health School since October,
1969, at which time he was temporarily hospitalized.
Thereafter Michael was excluded from school because
of health problems and school absences. Defendants
have not provided him with a full hearing or with a
timely and adequate review of his status. Despite his
mother's efforts, and his attending physician's medical
opinion that he could attend school, Michael has
provide its "exceptional children" 81 with appropriate public education
and training,82 and (2) the District of Columbia's practice of
suspending the excluding, expelling, reassigning, and transferring
remained on a waiting list for a tuition grant and
excluded from all publicly-supported education.
JANICE KING is thirteen years old, black, resident
with her father, Andrew King .... and unable to afford
private instruction. She has been denied access to public
schools since reaching compulsory school attendance
age, as a result of the rejection of her application,
based on the lack of an appropriate educational program.
Janice is brain-damaged and retarded, with right
hemiplegia, resulting from a childhood illness.
Defendants have not provided her with a full hearing or
with a timely and adequate review of her status. Despite
repeated efforts by her parents, Janice has been excluded
from all publicly-supported education.
JEROME JAMES is twelve years old, black,
resident with his mother, Mary James, . . . [in]
Washington, D.C., . . . Jerome is a retarded child and
has been totally excluded from public school.
Defendants have not given him a full hearing or a timely
and adequate review of his status. Despite his mother's
efforts to secure either public school placement or a
tuition grant, Jerome has remained on a waiting list for a
tuition grant and excluded from all publicly supported
education. Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866 at 869-70.
The court is quick to point out that, although all of the plaintiffs are African
American, their race is not determinative of the class of children they represent. Id.
at 870. The plaintiffs represent all school age children with disabilities. Id.
Though the court quickly glosses over this, the fact remains that the plaintiffs were
all black children and were all being excluded from the public school system
because of their alleged disabilities. While some of these plaintiffs clearly have
disabilities, this exclusion of black children from the public school system by
labeling them disabled was exactly what many civil rights activists feared. It is
also important to note that all of the plaintiffs were poor and without the requisite
financial means to obtain private instruction, id.; thus, the only way these children
could obtain any education was through the State's public school system.
81. The term "exceptional children" is defined by the court as including the
mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped, hyperactive and
all other children with behavioral problems. Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866 at 868. It is
also important to note that Mills involves a broader class of children than PARC,
which dealt solely with the mentally retarded.
82. Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866 at 868.
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children with disabilities from its regular public schools.83 Unlike
the defendant in PARC, the Board of Education of the District of
Columbia ("the Board") acknowledged its failure to provide disabled
children with access to a free public education.84 The Board argued
that it knew of this affirmative obligation, but lacked the requisite
resources to carry it out.85 The Board's financial defense proved
futile.86 In response the court held, "[The Board's] failure to fulfill
this clear duty to include and retain these children in the public
school system, or otherwise provide them with publicly-supported
education, and their failure to afford them due process hearings and
periodical review, cannot be excused by the claim that there are
insufficient funds." 87
Thus, PARC and Mills left the special education community with
three principles that would guide the future development of the law. 88
First, schools cannot exclude students from access to a public
education solely on the basis of a disability.89 Second, parents are
entitled to challenge the school's decisions with respect to their
children's education and parents must be given the means for such a
challenge (i.e. impartial hearings and access to the courts).90 Finally,
the alleged high cost of educating children with disabilities is not a
defense for failure to provide disabled children with access to a free
and public education.91 In the aftermath of PARC and Mills, similar
decisions were rendered in the courts across the county.92 By 1974,
litigation in twenty-seven states had produced similar results and
many states even enacted laws that mandated that individuals with
disabilities be given equal access to the public school system. 93
d). The 1972 Congressional Investigation
83. Id
84. Id. at 871.
85. Id
86. Id. at 876.
87. Id
88. Palmaffi, supra note 45, at 4-5.
89. Id
90. Id.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id
93. Id
But, this movement to provide an appropriate education to all
individuals with disabilities did not end with the states. After PARC
and Mills, Congress launched an investigation aimed at uncovering
the true educational status of children with disabilities in the United
States.94 The investigations revealed that nearly five million disabled
children were not receiving an appropriate education. 95
Yet, the most recent statistic provided by the
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimated
that of the more than 8 million children . . . with
handicapping conditions requiring special education
and related services, only 3.9 million such children are
receiving an appropriate education. 1.75 million
handicapped children are receiving no educational
services at all, and 2.5 million handicapped children
are receiving an inappropriate education.96
The investigations moved Congress, and members responded by
writing:
The long range implications of these statistics are
that public agencies and taxpayers will spend billions
of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to
maintain such persons as dependents and in a
minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education
services, many would be able to become productive
citizens, contributing to society instead of being
forced to remain burdens. Other, through such
services, would increase their independence, thus
reducing their dependence on society.
There is no pride in being forced to receive
economic assistance. Not only does this have
negative effects upon the handicapped person, but it
has far-reaching effects for such person's family.
94. Wright, supra note 50, at 14.
95. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 1975, at 1430
[hereinafter U.S.C.C.A.N. 1975].
96. Id. at 1432.
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Providing educational services will ensure against
persons needlessly being forced into institutional
settings. One need only look at public residential
institutions to find thousands of persons whose
families are no longer able to care for them and who
themselves have received no educational services.
Billions of dollars are expended each year to maintain
persons in these subhuman conditions ....
Parents of handicapped children all too frequently
are not able to advocate the rights of their children
because they have been erroneously led to believe that
their children will not be able to lead meaningful lives.
It should not . . . be necessary for parents
throughout the country to continue utilizing the courts
to assure themselves a remedy. . . .97
e). The Road to the IDEA
Following the 1972 Congressional Investigation and its results,
Congress enacted Public Law 94-142, also known as The Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EAHCA").98 The
EAHCA provided funding, and clearer, more specific mandates than
any of the earlier special education legislation.99 The law sought to
ensure access to a free public education and due process of law for all
children with disabilities.'00 But, Congress was not blind to the need
for an appropriate checks and balances system.' 0 ' Thus, in order to
hold State and local educational agencies "accountable for providing
educational services for all handicapped children,"102 the EAHCA
included elaborate "procedural safeguards" designed to protect the
97. Wright, supra note 50, at 14 (quoting U.S.C.C.A.N. 1975, supra note 95 at
1433).
98.. Wright, supra note 50, at 14. The EAHCA is later renamed the
Individuals with Disabilities Act ("IDEA") in 1990. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 5.
99. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 5.
100. Wright, supra note 50, at 14.
101. Id.
102. Wright, supra note 50, at 14 (quoting U.S.C.C.A.N. 1975, supra note 95,
at 1427).
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rights of both children and their parents."0 3 As the EAHCA was
amended these procedural safeguards underwent elaborate changes as
well.
3. The Modem Era of Special Education Law
Since 1975, the special education law originally entitled the
EAHCA has been amended and renamed by Congress several
times. 10 4 In 1990, the Act took on its current name: The Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). 10 5  Most recently, on
December 3, 2004, the IDEA'0 6 underwent a reauthorization. 10 7 The
amended statute is named the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004 and is most commonly known as IDEA
2004 ("IDEA 2004").'08 IDEA 2004 has two primary purposes: (1)
to provide every child with an education designed to meet his or her
unique needs and prepare him or her for further education,
employment, and independent living, 109 and (2) to protect the rights
of children with disabilities and their parents through procedural
safeguards. 110
These procedural safeguards are enumerated in 20 U.S.C. § 1415
et seq. of IDEA 2004 and contain a provision for attorney's fees.
The provision of IDEA 2004 governing the award of attorney's fees,
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) ("§ 1415(i)(3)(B)"), provides that "[i]n any
action or proceeding brought under this section, the court in its
discretion may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the
costs.""' Under IDEA 2004, prevailing parents 112 can recover from
103. Wright, supra note 50, at 14.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Palmaffy, supra note 45, at 5.
106. Formerly the EAHCA.
107. Wright, supra note 50, at 15.
108. Id. The statute encompasses 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. and the federal
regulations accompanying the statute are published in 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1).
110. Id.
111. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
112. For a discussion on the definition of the term "prevailing party" see
generally Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court "held that the term
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their attorney's fees from school districts."13 This provision allowing
parents to recover attorney's fees was not a new addition to IDEA
2004. 14 Rather, the provision awarding attorney's fees to prevailing
parties was explicitly added to the text of the IDEA by Congress
following the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson.115 In
Smith, the Court held that under the then current text of the IDEA,
prevailing parents were not entitled to attorney's fees." 6 In response,
Congress amended the IDEA to expressly include the phrase, "the
court, in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees as part
of the costs to prevailing parents,""' 7 and to overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith.118 Thus, the attorney's fees provision in
'prevailing party,' as it is used in various attorney's fees statutes, requires a
'material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties."' Bennett v. Yoshina,
259 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604).
Buckhannon dealt with the attorney's fees provisions of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Then, in Shapiro v. Paradise Valley, the Ninth Circuit considered the question
of whether Buckhannon applies to the IDEA's attorney's fees provision. Shapiro v.
Paradise Valley, 374 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2004). The court explained how it had
applied Buckhannon to a number of other attorney's fees statutes. See, e.g., Kasza
v. Whitman, 325 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Buckhannon to the fee-
shifting provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 6972(e)); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2002)
(applying Buckhannon to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A)); Bennett, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying
Buckhannon to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
1988). Id. The court also pointed out that other circuits had already determined
that Buckhannon applies to the attorney's provisions of the IDEA. Id. Ultimately
the court held that Buckhannon's definition of "prevailing party" applies to the
IDEA's attorney's fees provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Id.
113. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
114. See id.
115. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
116. Id. at 1007-08.
117. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); see 132 Cong. Rec. 16823 (1986) (remarks of
Sen. Weiker). Congress submitted a Conference Report concerning the above-
mentioned amendment of the IDEA which provided that the IDEA include an
explicit attorney's fees provision. Id. On the floor, sponsors of the new legislation
made it clear that this legislation's purpose was to overrule the Supreme Court's
decision in Smith. Id.
118. 132 Cong. Rec. 16823 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Weiker). Senator Weiker
expressly remarked, "In adopting this legislation, we are rejecting the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in Smith versus Robinson." Id. Further, according to
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IDEA 2004 explicitly provides that a prevailing party may recover
attorney's fees.
There are, however, several new additions to the attorney's fees
provision in IDEA 2004.1 Specifically, school districts may now
recover attorney's fees from parents or from the parent's attorney in
limited situations. 20 These limited situations include the filing, by a
parent or attorney, of a complaint for a frivolous, unreasonable, or
improper purpose, or to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation. 12' In these specific
circumstances, the court may award school districts reasonable
attorney's fees. 22 These new provisions to § 1415(i)(3)(B) in IDEA
2004 were injected to counter the growing concern that certain
parents were unnecessarily increasing special education litigation. 123
According to attorney Peter Wright: 124
Some parents, driven by anger and frustration, request
due process hearings although they have not prepared
their case. They may be focused on perceived wrongs
by the school, not on obtaining a program that will
meet their child's needs. Unfortunately, many hearing
officers and judges view parents of children with
disabilities as emotional "loose canons." These
parents not only lose their cases, but they create ill
will for other parents who use due process procedures
to resolve disputes.125
Representative Biaggi, "[t]his legislation clearly supports the intent of Congress
back in 1975 and corrects what I believe was a gross misrepresentation of the law.
Attorney's fees should be provided to those individuals who are being denied
access to the educational system." Id. at 17609 (remarks of Rep. Biaggi).




123. See Wright, supra note 50, at 117, n. 149.
124. Peter Wright is a special education attorney and has represented children
with disabilities since 1975. Wright, supra note 50. He represented Shannon
Carter before the United States Supreme Court in Florence County Sch. Dist. v.
Shannon Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), where he won a landmark victory that has
benefited all children with disabilities. Wright, supra note 50.
125. Wright, supra note 50, at 117, n.149.
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B. The Spending Clause and Federal Funding
In Arlington, the Court categorized IDEA 2004's fee-shifting
attorney's fees provision as Spending Clause legislation. 26 Recently,
federal grants, like those given to States under the IDEA, have
increased rapidly. 127 From 1965 to 1995 the total federal grants-in-
aid and shared revenue increased from approximately eleven billion
dollars to around 228 billion dollars in funding. 128 In 1994, twenty-
three percent of state and local government budgets were funded by
federal grants. 129
In general, Congress' power to spend is granted in the Spending
Clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution and provides as follows: "[t]he Congress shall have the
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
all the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.' 3 °
Thus, Congress is granted the power to tax and spend as long as
the "common Defence and general Welfare" are being served.' 3 ' As
Justice Roberts states in United States v. Butler, "The true
construction undoubtedly is that the only thing granted is the power
to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation's
debts and making provision for the general welfare .".."132
1. Butler and the Scope of Congress' Power to Spend
Until 1937 the question of whether Congress' spending power
was limited to the powers enumerated in the Constitution or whether
126. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2458. An in depth discussion of the Court's
analysis of Arlington can be found below in Part IV of this article, entitled Analysis
& Critique of Opinion.
127. VIKRAM AMAR, WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 196 (12th ed. 2005).
128. Id. (citing Statistical Abstract 1995, at 302).
129. Id. (citing StatisticalAbstract 1995, at 302).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
131. Id
132. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1936).
Congress could spend for whatever purpose it deemed appropriate
remained unanswered. 33 Finally, in Butler, the Court held that the
power to spend and the power to tax were expressly granted; the
power to spend and tax are enumerated powers themselves,
independent of the other enumerated powers.' 34 Thus, the Court held
that Congress could spend and tax in furtherance of the general
welfare without furthering any other enumerated power. 135 In other
words, Congress could spend for whatever purpose it wished as long
as the spending was in furtherance of the general welfare.
In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts explains the two
divergent interpretations of the phrase "to provide for the general
welfare."' 36  First, in Madison's view, the United States is a
government of enumerated and limited powers; thus, "the power to
tax and spend for the general welfare must be confined to the
enumerated legislative fields committed to the Congress."'' 37
However, according to Roberts, this interpretation ultimately leads to
the conclusion that Congress could spend for the general welfare as it
wished, since, in reality, Congress could almost always categorize
their spending within those powers enumerated in the Constitution.' 38
On the other hand, in Hamilton's view, the spending clause:
confers a power separate and distinct from those later
enumerated [and] is not restricted in meaning by the
grant of them, and Congress consequently has a
substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited
only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to
provide for the general welfare of the United States. 139
In other words, the Hamiltonian view took a broad approach and
defined Congress' power to tax and spend as an individual
enumerated power separate from the other enumerated powers. 140
133. See id. at 65.
134. Id. at 66.
135. Id
136. Id. at 65.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 65-66.
140. Id
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However, while the Butler Court opted for a broad interpretation of
the spending clause, it also recognized that this interpretation was not
without limitation. 141
Butler involved a major New Deal measure known as the
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933 ("1933 Act").142 The 1933 Act
was enacted to raise farm prices and reduce the production of certain
crops. 143 To reduce production, the 1933 Act required that farmers
produce less of the particular crop and it placed a tax upon the
processing of those crops. 44 In order to carry out this scheme, the
Secretary of Agriculture ("Secretary") was authorized to contract
with individual farmers to reduce their acreage in exchange for
benefit payments. 145 These benefit payments were paid from a tax
that was placed on the processing of the commodity. 146 This tax was
referred to as a "processing tax., 147 Subsequently, the Secretary
entered into several agreements for the reduction of cotton
production and a processing tax was placed upon the processors of
cotton. 14 8 One of these processors was Hoosac Mills and Butler was
their receiver. 149 As a result, Butler brought suit to recover the tax
arguing that the Act was an unconstitutional program to control
agricultural production. 150
Because the Court held that the power to spend and tax for the
general welfare was a separate and distinct power granted to
Congress, there was no problem with the Act on that ground. 15
However, the Court did find the Act unconstitutional on different
141. Id
142. Amar et al., supra note 127 at 196.
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id. Benefit payments were computed on the basis of the reduction
amount agreed to by the farmer.
146. Id
147. See id.
148. Id. The agreements were to reduce the total acreage of cotton being
produced. While cotton is the commodity dealt with in Butler, agreements were





grounds. 5 2  The Court stated that since it had taken the broad
Hamiltonian view of the phrase, "to provide for the general welfare,"
limitations were necessary. 153  As a result, the Court held that
Congress's power to provide for the general welfare lies within its
power to spend and tax.154 In other words, Congress' power to
provide for the general welfare was not a power independent of its
power to spend and tax.1 55 Thus, Congress could only spend or tax
for the general welfare and could not regulate for the general
welfare.1 56  Hence, legislative regulations must encompass an
enumerated power outside of the spending and taxing power. 157 It
was on this ground that the Act, in its regulatory nature, was struck
down as unconstitutional.' 58 Thus, Butler recognized the broad
power granted to Congress to spend for the general welfare.
2. The Clear Notice Requirement
While Congress could not directly regulate State action through
the use of its spending power, it could indirectly regulate the States
by placing conditions on States' receipt of federal funding. 159 For
example, in South Dakota v. Dole, the Court upheld a federal statute
that withheld federal highway funds from any state whose drinking
age was under twenty-one.' 60 The Dole court reaffirmed the notion
that Congress, under its spending power, could attach conditions to
States' receipt of federal funding. 16 ' However, the Court also pointed
out that the spending power granted to Congress is not without
limitation. 162  The Court carefully laid out the four general
restrictions that case law had placed upon Congress' broad power to
152. Id. at 68.
153. Id. at65.
154. Id. at 68-70.
155. Id.
156. Id
157. Id. at 71.
158. Id
159. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987).
160. Id. at 205-206, 218.
161. Id. at 207.
162. Id
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spend for the general welfare.' 63 First, Congress must spend for the
benefit of the general welfare.' 64 Second, if Congress intends to
place a condition on States' receipt of federal funding, it "must do so
unambiguously . . ., enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.' 65
Third, the conditions placed on the receipt of federal funds must be
related "to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs. ' 66 Finally, other constitutional limitations could
potentially bar the conditional grant of federal funds. 167 In Arlington,
the Court grapples with the second limitation mentioned above and
answers the question of whether the IDEA gives clear notice of its
conditions to the States accepting its funds. 168
C. Statutory Interpretation and Costs as a Term ofArt: The
Supreme Court's Interpretation of Other Fee Shifting Provisions169
Prior to Arlington, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
interpret fee-shifting provisions in other legislation. Specifically, the
Court relies on its decisions in Crawford Fitting7 ° and Casey171 to
determine the correct interpretation of the IDEA's attorney's fees
provision.
163. Id
164. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65. However, as noted in Dole, substantial deference
is given to Congress when considering whether a particular expenditure furthers the
general welfare. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
165. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)) (internal quotes omitted).
166. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435
U.S. 444, 461 (1968) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotes omitted).
167. Id.
168. See infra Part IV.
169. The IDEA's attorney's fee provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), is a fee-
shifting provision in that that attorney's fees incurred by prevailing parents are
shifting to noncompliant school districts. In certain situations, fees incurred by
school districts are shifted to parents. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
170. See generally Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. Champion Int'l
Co., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (holding "absent explicit statutory or contractual
authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant's costs, federal courts are
bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920"). Id. at 445.
171. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
In Crawford Fitting, the Court rejected the argument that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) ("Rule 54(d)") authorizes the award of
costs not listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1821.172 Rule 54(d) provides for an
award of "costs" to a prevailing party.'73 "The Court held, however,
that Rule 54(d) does not give a district judge 'discretion to tax
whatever costs may seem appropriate'; rather, the term "costs" in
Rule 54(d) is defined by the list set out in [28 U.S.C.A.] § 1920." (§
1920).174 Thus, since Rule 54(d) lacks explicit language referring to
expert fees, it is defined by those categories of expenses enumerated
in § 1920.'7 The Court interpreted the statute narrowly, pointing out
that § 1920(3) is strictly limited by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821 ("§ 1821").176
172. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 439.
173. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2461.
174. Id. at 2462 (quoting Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. 437 at 441). § 1920
provides as follows:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States
may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part
of the stenographic transcript
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of
papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title
[28 USCS § 1923];
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title [28 USCS §
1828].
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon
allowance, included in the judgment or decree. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1920.
175. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. at 2462.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 provides as follows:
(a) (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a
witness in attendance at any court of the United States,
or before a United States Magistrate [United States
Magistrate Judge], or before any person authorized to
take his deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a
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court of the United States, shall be paid the fees and
allowances provided by this section.
(2) As used in this section, the term "court of the
United States" includes, in addition to the courts listed
in section 451 of this title [28 USCS § 4511, any court
created by Act of Congress in a territory which is
invested with any jurisdiction of a district court of the
United States.
(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $
40 per day for each day's attendance. A witness shall
also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily
occupied in going to and returning from the place of
attendance at the beginning and end of such attendance
or at any time during such attendance.
(c) (1) A witness who travels by common carrier
shall be paid for the actual expenses of travel on the
basis of the means of transportation reasonably utilized
and the distance necessarily traveled to and from such
witness's residence by the shortest practical route in
going to and returning from the place of attendance.
Such a witness shall utilize a common carrier at the
most economical rate reasonably available. A receipt or
other evidence of actual cost shall be furnished.
(2) A travel allowance equal to the mileage
allowance which the Administrator of General Services
has prescribed, pursuant to section 5704 of title 5, for
official travel of employees of the Federal Government
shall be paid to each witness who travels by privately
owned vehicle. Computation of mileage under this
paragraph shall be made on the basis of a uniformed
table of distances adopted by the Administrator of
General Services.
(3) Toll charges for toll roads, bridges, tunnels, and
ferries, taxicab fares between places of lodging and
carrier terminals, and parking fees (upon presentation of
a valid parking receipt), shall be paid in full to a witness
incurring such expenses.
(4) All normal travel expenses within and outside
the judicial district shall be taxable as costs pursuant to
section 1920 of this title [28 U.S.C. § 1920].
(d) (1) A subsistence allowance shall be paid to a
witness when an overnight stay is required at the place
of attendance because such place is so far removed from
the residence of such witness as to prohibit return
thereto from day to day.
In the Court's view, a broader interpretation would, in effect,
cause Rule 54(d) to repeal § § 1920 and 1821, even though Rule 54(d)
fails to explicitly refer to witness fees.177 Thus, Crawford Fitting
stands for the proposition that "no statute will be construed as
authorizing the taxation of witness fees as costs unless the statute
refers explicitly to witness fees."' 7 8
(2) A subsistence allowance for a witness shall be
paid in an amount not to exceed the maximum per diem
allowance prescribed by the Administrator of General
Services, pursuant to section 5702(a) of title 5, for
official travel in the area of attendance by employees of
the Federal Government.
(3) A subsistence allowance for a witness attending
in an area designated by the Administrator of General
Services as a high-cost area shall be paid in an amount
not to exceed the maximum actual subsistence
allowance prescribed by the Administrator, pursuant to
section 5702(c)(B) of title 5, for official travel in such
area by employees of the Federal Government.
(4) When a witness is detained pursuant to section
3144 of title 18 for want of security for his appearance,
he shall be entitled for each day of detention when not in
attendance at court, in addition to his subsistence, to the
daily attendance fee provided by subsection (b) of this
section.
(e) An alien who has been paroled into the United
States for prosecution, pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)), or an alien who either has admitted
belonging to a class of aliens who are deportable or has
been determined pursuant to section 240 of such Act (8
U.S.C. 1252(b) [1229a]) to be deportable, shall be
ineligible to receive the fees or allowances provided by
this section.
(f) Any witness who is incarcerated at the time that
his or her testimony is given (except for a witness to
whom the provisions of section 3144 of title 18 apply)
may not receive fees or allowances under this section,
regardless of whether such a witness is incarcerated at
the time he or she makes a claim for fees or allowances
under this section. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821.
177. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2462.
178. Id. (quoting Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445) (internal quotations
omitted).
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In Casey, the Supreme Court again interpreted a fee-shifting
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("§ 1988"). The provision
"permit[ed] prevailing parties in certain civil rights actions to be
awarded reasonable attorney's fee as part of costs."17 9 The Court
held that absent explicit statutory language, expert fees incurred in
civil rights litigation may not be shifted to the losing party as part of
the statute's award of reasonable attorney's fees. 180 Because the
statute was unambiguous on its face, the rules of statutory
interpretation require that the Court look at the statutes plain meaning
and not to statements made by legislatures or committees during the
enactment process.' 8 ' Thus, the Court concluded that the plain
meaning of § 1988 did not shift the cost of expert fees to the losing
party, but that experts were still able to recover fees pursuant to §
1920 and § 1821.182 Together, Crawford Fitting and Casey represent
the case precedent crucial to the Court's final decision in Arlington.
III. FACTS
A. Substantive Case History
1. The 1998-1999 School Year
Pearl and Theodore Murphy (the "Murphys") are the parents of
Joseph, a child with a disability as defined under the IDIEA. 183 In
1994, Joseph was identified as a student requiring special
education.' 84 Joseph completed his 1997-1998 school year in the
Arlington School District ("Arlington"); therefore, Arlington High
School became Joseph's educational placement for the approaching
1998-1999 school year. 185 The individualized education program
("IEP") prepared for Joseph by Arlington for the 1998-1999 school
179. Id. (quoting Casey, 499 U.S. 83 at 102) (internal quotations omitted).
180. Casey, 499 U.S. at 85.
181. Id. at 97-102.
182. Id. at 102.




year again placed him at Arlington High School. 186 The Murphys,
however, refused to approve the Arlington IEP. Pursuant to their
rights under the IDEA, the Murphys proceeded to request a due
process hearing.' 87  According to the IDEA's stay-put provision,
Joseph should have remained at Arlington High School during the
pendency of the Murphys' due process hearing request; but, the
Murphys continued to feel that Arlington High School was an
inappropriate placement for Joseph and were increasingly unwilling
to allow their son to remain in such a setting.' 88 In response to their
concerns, the Murphys unilaterally withdrew Joseph from Arlington
High School, and enrolled him at Kildonan, a private school. 8 9 The
Murphys paid for Joseph's attendance at Kildonan for the 1998-1999
school year.' 90
During the 1998-1999 school year, the Murphys continued to
pursue administrative remedies.' 91 New York law provides for a
two-tier system of administrative review in special education
litigation.' 92 An impartial hearing officer ("IHO") presided over the
Murphys' first hearing.' 93 On July 7, 1999, the IHO reached his
decision, holding that: (1) Arlington's proposed IEP for the 1998-
1999 school year was inadequate to meet Joseph's special needs, (2)
Kildonan was an appropriate placement, and (3) the Murphys were
entitled to reimbursement for Joseph's tuition and the costs of a
private speech pathologist.' 94  Arlington appealed the IHO's
decision.'
95
The second tier of the administrative proceedings in New York
involves a state review officer ("SRO"). 19 6 While Arlington's appeal
was pending before the SRO, the Murphys decided to file a
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York.19 7  The Murphys sought a temporary restraining order
requiring Arlington to fund Joseph's tuition at Kildonan during the
pendency of the appeal. t98 Before a decision was rendered, the case
was transferred to the District Court for the Southern District of New
York ("District Court").' 9 9  However, the District Court was
ultimately unable to determine on the record before it whether it
possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the Murphys' action.200
But, before the District Court had settled the jurisdiction issue, the
SRO affirmed the decision of the IHO.20 ' The SRO held that
Kildonan was the appropriate placement for Joseph and ordered
Arlington to reimburse the Murphys for the tuition they had paid for
the 1998-1999 school year.20 2 Arlington appealed the SRO's
decision in state court. However, even though an appeal was pending
in state court, Arlington nevertheless paid the Murphys for Joseph's
1998 Kildonan tuition.20 3 Thus, the District Court, still deciding
whether it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the Murphy's
complaint, dismissed the Murphys' case as moot.20 4
2. The 1999-2000 School Year
While this conflict wound its way through the state administrative
system and the courts, the 1999-2000 school year loomed ahead.20 5
Arlington again proposed an IEP placing Joseph at Arlington High
School, and the Murphys again rejected it.20 6  Once again the
Murphys unilaterally enrolled Joseph at Kildonan for the 1999-2000
207thschool year. Then the Murphy's invoked their right to an













requesting reimbursement for Joseph's Kildonan tuition for the 1999-
2000 school year.20 8 Thus, the Murphy's again set in motion the
same process that they had just completed with respect to the 1998-
1999 school year.20 9
Again, during the pendency of their administrative remedies, the
Murphy's filed a motion before the District Court seeking a court
order to compelling Arlington to pay Joseph's Kildonan tuition for
the 1999-2000 school year.2 '0 The District Court held that the SROs
decision constituted an "agreement" by the state that Joseph's current
educational placement was Kildonan.21 Pursuant to the IDEA's
stay-put provisions, the District Court ordered Arlington to pay
Joseph's Kildonan tuition from the date the of the SRO's decision
regarding tuition reimbursement for the prior 1998 school year until
Joseph's educational placement changes or a court orders
otherwise. 2 12 Arlington appealed the District Court's decision and
the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court, requiring Arlington to
pay for Joseph's Kildonan tuition for the above-mentioned school
years.213
B. Seeking Fees and the Jurisdictional Split
As prevailing parents on substantive grounds, the Murphys
returned to the courts in 2002 seeking reimbursement for the expert
consulting fees they had incurred during their IDEA litigation. 214
During the substantive IDEA proceedings, the Murphys were assisted
by Marilyn Arons ("Arons"), an educational consultant.2 15







214. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2458.
215. Id
216. The Murphys' suit for fees was initiated in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Thus, any further reference to the District Court
refers to the District Court for the Southern District of New York.
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Under the IDEA's fee-shifting provision, 20 U.S.C. 1415
(i)(3)(B), the District Court subsequently allowed the Murphys to
recover part of their requested fees.217 The Murphys initially sought
to recover $29,350 in fees for Arons' services and the District Court
ultimately reduced their award to $8,650.218 First, the District Court
held that the Murphys could only recover fees incurred from Arons
between the Murphys' initial hearing request and the court's ruling in
their favor.219 According to the District Court, only this time frame
constituted an action or proceeding as defined in the IDEA.22°
Finally, the District Court held that the Murphys could not recover
fees for work Arons performed that was similar to that of an
222
attorney. 21 Since Arons was a not a lawyer, she could only be
compensated for her time spent as an expert consultant.222 However,
the District Court classified all her time as expert consultant time so
the Murphys were entitled to recover the full $8,650.223
2. The Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Arlington subsequently appealed the District Court's decision and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit")
affirmed.224 The Second Circuit acknowledged contradictory rulings
from other circuits, but decided that a broad, strict contextual reading
of the IDEA's attorney's fees provision was appropriate.
225
Ultimately, the Second Circuit held that, "[C]ongress intended to and
did authorize the reimbursement of expert fees in IDEA actions."226
In making its decision, the Second Circuit recognized the Supreme
217. Id.
218. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d. 332, 334
(2d Cir. 2005).







226. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d
332, 336 (2d. Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
Court's decision in Crawford Fitting and Casey, but relied heavily on
the 1986 House Conference Committee Report relating to §
1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA ("the Report") and to dicta in a footnote in
Casey referring to the Report.227 The Second Circuit believed that,
based on these two authorities, it was required to interpret the
IDEA's attorney's fees provision as authorizing the award of expert
fees.228 In 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether Congress authorized an award of expert fees under
the IDEA's attorney's fees provision. 229 Arguments were heard on
April 19, 2006, and in a 6-3 decision the Court reversed the lower
courts' decisions and held that because the IDEA did not explicitly
allow prevailing parents to recover expert fees, an award of expert
fees was not available pursuant to the IDEA's attorney's fees
provision. 230
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF OPINION
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.231 Justice Ginsburg
filed a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment and Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, filed a passionate
dissent.232
A. Justice Alito's Majority Opinion
Justice Alito begins his majority opinion with a quick review of
the underlying facts of the case and in-depth outline of its procedural
history.233 He quickly characterizes the case as a Spending Clause
case, and thus, the primary issue is whether the IDEA234 has provided
227. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2458.
228. Id
229. Id
230. Id. at 2455
231. Id. at 2457.
232. Id
233. Id. at 2457-58.
234. It is important to note that this case is controlled by the IDEA prior to its
most current reauthorization, known as IDEA 2004. While the IDEA 2004 has
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states with the requisite notice.2 35 According to Justice Alito, "[the]
resolution of the question presented in this case is guided by the fact
that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause." 236
Because the IDEA was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause,
Congress must unambiguously set out the conditions attached to
States receipts of federal funds.237 In Justice Alito's view, "We must
view the IDEA from the perspective of a state official who is
engaged in the process of deciding whether the State should accept
IDEA funds and the obligations that go with those funds., 238  In
essence, the real issue in this case is "whether the IDEA furnishes
clear notice regarding the [award of expert fees]. 239 Justice Alito
proceeds to answer this question on three separate grounds. First, he
turns to the plain meaning of the statute. Second, he considers
Supreme Court precedent and its role in the interpretation of the
statutory language involved in this case. Finally, Justice Alito
considers and quickly dismisses the Murphys' arguments that the
IDEA's purpose and legislative intent should control the outcome of
the case.
undergone many changes, the provision in controversy here, § 1415(i)(3)(B), has
not undergone any significant changes that would affect the outcome of this case.
235. Id. at 2458-59.
236. Id. at 2458.
237. Id. at 2459.
238. Id
239. Id
1. The Plain Meaning of § 1415(i)(3)(B)
Justice Alito begins his discussion of whether the IDEA provides
clear notice with the plain text of the statute.2 40  The pertinent
language of § 1415(i)(3)(B) provides that "[i]n any action or
proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion,
may award reasonable attorneys'fees as part of the costs to the
parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party."24'
According to Justice Alito, the plain language of the provision does
not even hint at the possibility that States may be required to
reimburse parents who prevail in proceedings under the IDEA.242
The Murphys, on the other hand, argue that the Court should
interpret the term "costs" as it is used in the statute with respect to its
ordinary meaning. 243 In other words, the Murphys contend that the
term "costs" is not used as a term of art in the IDEA.244 Justice Alito
quickly points out the flaws in the Murphys' argument. 245  First,
"costs" is a term of art that generally does not include an award of
expert fees.24 6 In his view, if Congress had wanted to make States
liable for a whole host of expenses then Congress could have easily
substituted the word expenses for costs. 24 7 However, Congress chose
to use the term "costs" rather than expenses, suggesting that the
IDEA's attorney's fees provision is not an open-ended one that holds
States liable for all expenses incurred in the course of litigation.
248
240. Id
241. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added).
242. Id.





248. Id. at 2460. While Justice Alito distinguishes between the use of a term
of art such as "costs" and general language such as expenses, he fails to address the
argument that "costs" as it is used in the IDEA is not intended as a term of art.
Rather, "costs" should be interpreted with its ordinary meaning. In this case, such
an interpretation may provide the ambiguity needed to force the Court to consider
the legislative history and the goals of the IDEA, which were so heavily relied on
by the Murphys and the proponents of the interpretation of the IDEA allowing an
award of expert fees as part of the costs incurred during IDEA proceedings.
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Further, the grammatical construction of the provision indicates that
reasonable attorney's fees are within the costs that a court, in its
discretion, may award to prevailing parents.249 In the Court's view, §
1415(i)(3)(B) merely adds attorney's fees to the list of recoverable
costs otherwise enumerated in § 1920.250 According to the Court, the
statute does not provide that parents may recover costs. 25' Thus,
under its current construction, § 1415(i)(3)(b) does not explicitly
authorize an award of expert fees up and beyond those enumerated in
§ 1920 and limited by § 1821, and it fails to provide the requisite
clear notice to States.25
2
To strengthen the argument that the IDEA fails to provide clear
notice regarding expert fees, Justice Alito considers other provisions
of the IDEA.253 Specifically, §§ 1415(i)(3)(C)-(G) of the IDEA were
designed to ensure that awards of attorneys' fees are in fact
reasonable. 254 In the Court's view, the fact that these provisions fail
to mention expert fees is a clear indication that the IDEA does not
authorize such an award.255 Additionally, the Court points to the
provision of the IDEA, § 1415(d)(2), that requires school districts to
provide parents with "a full explanation of the procedural
safeguards" available to them under the IDEA.256 Like every other
provision mentioned by the Court, § 1415(d)(2) also fails to mention
expert fees, yet expressly references attorney's fees. 7 Justice Alito
takes the' position that if the IDEA actually authorized an award of
expert fees to prevailing parents then expert fees should be
mentioned in at least those provisions comparable to §
249. Id
250. Id. Section 1920 is the general statute governing the taxation of costs in
federal court and is strictly limited by § 1821. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc. Champion Int'l Co., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), supra note 158 and
accompanying text.





256. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
257. Id
1415(i)(3)(B) 8  Yet, there is no mention of expert fees in any
pertinent provision of the IDEA.259
Next, the Murphys relied on a provision of the Handicapped
Children's Protection Act of 1986 to support their interpretation of §
1415(i)(3)(B). The specific provision relied on by the Murphys
required the General Accounting Office ("GAO") to conduct a study
concerning special education.2 6 0 The study required that the GAO
collect data concerning:
(A) the specific amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses awarded to the prevailing party in IDEA
cases . . ., and (B) the number of hours spent by
personnel, including attorneys and consultants,
involved in the action or proceeding, and expenses
incurred by the parents and the State educational
agency and local educational agency.261
Turning first to paragraph (A) of the study, Justice Alito points
out that it never mentions consultant, experts, or such fees, and
paragraph (A) is not asking the GAO to study the amount of awards
given to prevailing parties with respect to consultant hiring
expenses. 62 If the study had mentioned either of these then the
Murphys might have found some support for their proposition.263
Paragraph (B) fails as well.264 The Court explains, "[j]ust because
Congress directed the GAO to compile statistics on the hours spent
by consultants in IDEA cases, it does not follow that Congress meant
for States to compensate prevailing parties for the fees billed by these
consultants. 265 Justice Alito goes on to list some of the reasons why
Congress would ask for such data, but still not intend to make expert
258. See id
259. Id. In fact, expert fees are not mentioned in any provision of the IDEA.
260. Id.
261. Id. (quoting § 4(b)(3), 100 Stat. 797, 797-98) (internal quotes omitted).
262. Id
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2461.
265. Id
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fees recoverable by prevailing parties. 266 Most importantly, Justice
Alito explains that data regarding the costs of litigation would be
useful to Congress in constructing future amendments to the IDEA in
general, or to its attorney's fees provision.267 Justice Alito notes that
the study also called for data to be compiled regarding the costs
incurred by state and local educational agencies, even though at the
time of the study the IDEA did not authorize an award to either.268
Hence, the plain text of the IDEA fails to provide States with the
requisite clear notice that is required if Congress wishes to make
States' receipt of federal funds conditional.269 Thus, Justice Alito
concludes that the terms of the IDEA do not support the Murphys'
contention that the IDEA provides an award of expert fees to
prevailing parents.270
2. The Role of Precedent in Statutory Interpretation
Justice Alito finds his strongest support for the Court's
interpretation of § 1415(i)(3)(B) in the Court's own case
precedent.27' When viewing the present case in light of the Court's
decisions in Crawford Fitting and Casey, Justice Alito believes it is
clear that the IDEA fails to give IDEA funded States unambiguous
notice regarding their potential liability for expert fees. 272 Justice
Alito quickly applies the reasoning laid down by the Court in
Crawford Fitting to the term "costs" in § 1415(i)(3)(B).273 Like the
term "costs" in Rule 54(d), the term "costs" in § 1415(i)(3)(B) is
266. Id
267. Id
268. Id. Just as Justice Alito predicted, Congress has used the study as a
catalyst for the amendment of the IDEA. In 2004, Congress amended the IDEA to
include provisions that award costs to state or local educational agencies in certain
situations. The goal of the amendment was to reduce the amount of frivolous,
improper, and unreasonably costly litigation that would sometimes take place,





273. Id. at 2462.
defined by § 1920.274 Justice Alito strictly applies the principle
recognized in Crawford Fitting that no statute will be interpreted as
allowing the taxation of witness fees unless the statute explicitly
states otherwise. 275 Thus, under Crawford Fitting, because the IDEA
does not explicitly refer to the award of expert fees, one cannot imply
that the IDEA actually authorizes such an award.276
Justice Alito finds the Court's decision in Casey even more
compelling. 277 He notes that § 1988, the statute interpreted in Casey,
contained language practically identical to the language used in §
1415(i)(3)(B). Compare § 1415(i)(3)(B) which "authoriz[es] the
award of attorneys'fees as part of the costs to prevailing parents"
with § 1988 which "permit[s] prevailing parties in certain civil rights
actions to be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs."278 Justice Alito emphatically notes that in order to follow the
Murphys' proposed interpretation the Court would have to hold that
"the IDEA unambiguously means exactly the opposite of what the
nearly identical language in . . § 1988 was held to mean in
Casey., 279 The Court is unwilling, to say the least, to depart from its
decision in Casey and that decision's applicability to the case at
hand.28°
Finally, Justice Alito comments on the Second Circuit's weighty
reliance on a footnote in Casey.2 81  The footnote in question
contained the Report which stated, "The conferees intend[ed] that the





278. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added).
279. Id.
280. Importantly, Congress amended § 1988 following the Court's decision in
Casey to allow for the recovery of certain expert fees. A similar course of action
was taken by Congress with respect to other fee-shifting statutes but not with
respect to the IDEA. Thus, either Congress did not want to authorize an award of
expert fees under the IDEA and that is why they chose not to add the requisite
language in an amendment to the IDEA, or Congress already thought an award of
expert fees was clearly inferred from the IDEA's text, purpose, or legislative
history.
281. Id
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expenses and fees of expert witnesses . "..."282 In the footnote, the
Court stated that this statement by Congress represented an intention
to define a term of art.283 Justice Alito argues that, when read in
context, the footnote stands for the proposition that the term
"attorneys' fees," by itself, is not commonly understood to include
expert fees.284 He further explains that the footnote did not say that
the Report represented the correct interpretation of § 1415(i)(3)(B)
and that the Report, alone, does not provide States with the clear
notice required by the Spending Clause. 285  Thus, Justice Alito
concludes that the Court's reasoning in both Crawford Fitting and
Casey clearly support his notion that the IDEA fails to authorize an
award of attorney's fees.2 8 6
3. The IDEA's Purpose and Legislative Intent Do Not Provide Clear
Notice
To conclude his analysis, Justice Alito confronts two of the
Murphys' arguments that are unrelated to the text of the IDEA. 87
First, the Murphys argue that an award of expert fees as part of the
recoverable costs to prevailing parents would further the two of the
IDEA's most important goals.288 According to the Murphys, their
interpretation would further ensure that "all children with disabilities
282. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added).
283. Id
284. Id. at 2463.
285. Id. at 2462-63. Justice Alito glosses over the Report and its potential
impact on the interpretation of the provision in controversy. If anything, it
demonstrates Congress' intent to include expert fees as part of the costs recoverable
by prevailing parents. The strongest argument to exclude this potentially crippling
piece of information may be to conclude the IDEA, on its face, is unambiguous.
Then, the Court does not have to go any further. Justice Alito remains committed
to his Spending Clause argument and summarily concludes that the Report would
not provide States with the clear notice required by the Spending Clause. By doing
so, he makes concludes that clear notice is not given to States in Conference
Committee Reports. Something more is needed, and from the Court's opinion in
this case it seems that clear notice can only be found if explicit language is placed
in the text of the statute.




have available to them a free appropriate public education,"289 and
would "safeguard the rights of parent to challenge school decisions
that adversely affect their child., 290 According to Justice Alito, the
Murphys' argument fails because it is too general and because the
IDEA's goals are not intended to be promoted "at the expense of all
other considerations, including fiscal consideration. 29'
Second, the Murphys rely on the legislative history of §
1415(i)(3)(B) to support their argument that Congress intended to
compensate prevailing parents for expert fees incurred during
litigation.292 The Murphys again point to the Report mentioned
above, but Justice Alito is not swayed by this wolf dressed in sheep's
clothing. In his opinion, the legislative intent is not enough to
convince the Court to follow the Murphys' interpretation, especially
given the overwhelming weight of authority to the contrary.293 Both
the unambiguous text of the IDEA and the Court's reasoning in
Crawford Fitting and Casey support Justice Alito's interpretation of
the IDEA: that the IDEA does not authorize an award of expert fees
to prevailing parents. 294 But, he also returns again to the clear notice
requirement of the Spending Clause, explaining that the key to clear
notice is not what Congress intended but "what the States are clearly
told regarding the conditions that go along with the acceptance of
those funds. 2 95  Legislative history alone is not clear notice.296
Thus, Justice Alito and the Court Majority reverse the Second
Circuit's judgment and hold that the IDEA does not authorize an
award of expert fees to prevailing parents.
289. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A))(internal quotations omitted).
290. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents 20) (internal quotations omitted).
291. Id. While lack of financial means is not a defense for a school district's
failure to provide children with disabilities access to a free public education, fiscal
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B. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion.
C. Placing the Ball in Congress' Court
1. Critiquing the Majority
Justice Ginsburg concurs with the Court's holding, but finds
Justice Alito's Spending Clause analysis "unwarranted. '297 In her
opinion, Justice Alito unnecessarily takes Pennhurst's clear notice
out of its context and applies it to a rather low key case. Unlike in
Pennhurst,298 the case at hand deals only with the remedies available
to parents who prevail against noncompliant school districts.
299
Further, Justice Ginsburg is concerned with the Majority's constant
reference and reliance on the Spending Clause.3"' She quickly points
out that the IDEA was not only enacted pursuant to the Spending
Clause, but also pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.30 '
Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg finds that Justice Alito did not need
the "clear notice prop" because the Court's decision securely rests on
"twin pillars" which clearly support the Court's interpretation that the
IDEA does not authorize an award of expert fees to prevailing
parents. 3 2 First, the IDEA's provisions governing and controlling
attorneys' fees awards make no mention at all of expert or
professional services or fees. 303 Second, the Courts development of
analogous prior decisions both support and confirm the Court's
holding. 304
297. Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
298. Pennhurst dealt with the educational programs the IDEA directs school
districts to provide. Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
299. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
300. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
301. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,
1009 (1984) (holding that the EHA was "set up by Congress to aid the States in
complying with their constitutional obligations to provide public education for
handicapped children").
302. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
303. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
304. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
2. Critiquing the Dissent
Justice Ginsburg agrees with Justice Breyer's contention that
including expert costs in § 1415(i)(3)(B) is a good idea given the
IDEA's goal of providing "a free appropriate public education" to all
children with disabilities.30 5 However, as Justice Ginsburg points
out, "Congress did not compose § 1415(i)(3)(B)'s text, as it did the
texts of other statutes too numerous and varied to ignore, to alter the
common import of the terms 'attorneys' fees' and 'costs' in the
context of expense-allocated legislation." 30 6 For an example, Justice
Ginsburg turns to the statute in controversy in Casey and explains
that in 1991 Congress amended § 1988 to include "expert fees as part
of attorney's fees. '"307 According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court is
"not at liberty to rewrite 'the statutory text adopted by both Houses of
Congress and submitted to the President,' to add several words
Congress wisely might have included., 30 8  Thus, Justice Ginsburg
concluded that "the ball ...is properly left in Congress' court to
provide, if it so elects," for the authorization of an award of expert
fees under the IDEA.3 °9 With that, Justice Ginsburg disagrees only
with the Court's Spending Clause rationale and ultimately concurs in
its judgment.3 10
C. The Dissent and Its Critique of the Majority31
305. Id. at 2465 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §
1400(d)(1)(A)).
306. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
307. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
308. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Casey, 499 U.S. at 98).
309. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
310. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
311. Justice Souter joins in Justice Breyer's dissent but also filed a small,
separate dissent of his own. In it, Justice Breyer points out that he agrees with
Justice Breyer's distinction between this case and Barnes v. Gorman. Id. at 2466
(Souter, J., dissenting). He also emphasizes his reliance on the study conducted by
the GAO pursuant to the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986. Id.
(Souter, J., dissenting). Because of the existence if the GOA study, Justice Souter
finds Justice Breyer's reliance in the report relating to § 1415(i)(3)(B)
unreasonable. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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According to Justice Breyer, the word "costs" includes the costs
of experts and authorizes payment of such costs.3 12 Relying on the
report accompanying § 1415(i)(3)(B) and the fact that not one
Senator or Representative opposed the statement in the report which
specified that "the term attorneys' fees as part of the costs' include[s]
reasonable expenses of expert witnesses . . .," Justice Breyer
contends that Congress intended the IDEA to mean exactly what the
Murphys' proposed: the IDEA authorizes an award of expert fees to
prevailing parents.313
1. Congress Intended the IDEA to Include the Award of Expert Fees
Justice Breyer bases his interpretation of the IDEA attorney's
fees provision on two principles. 314 First, such an interpretation is
what Congress intended. Second, his interpretation "furthers the
IDEA's statutorily defined purposes. 315
a). Justice Breyer's Interpretation is What Congress Intended
To support his conclusion that Congress intended that the IDEA
authorize an award of expert fees, Justice Breyer gave an in-depth
overview of the Congressional history of the IDEA.316 Congress first
added a fee-shifting provision to the IDEA when it enacted the
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986. 3' 7 The provision
was added to explicitly overrule the Court's decision in Smith,
supra.318 Debates and hearings ensued.3 9 As a result, some Senators
introduced a new bill that placed a cap on the amount of recoverable
attorneys' fees but explicitly allowed the recovery of expert fees.320
Some objected to the cap, but no one objected to the expert fees
312. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
313. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986)).
314. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
315. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
316. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
317. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
319. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 2467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
provision.3 2' Another bill was proposed that used the language that a
court could award "a reasonable attorney's fee in addition to the costs
to a parent." 322 On the floor, Senator Weiker, a proponent of the bill,
explained that the drafters of the bill intended to include "necessary
expert witness fees and other reasonable expenses" 323 in the award of
reasonable costs to prevailing parents. 324 No one objected to Senator
Weiker's statement.325  The House reflected similar intentions and
again, no objections were raised.326 After the bill passed both houses,
members of Congress met to negotiate and produced the report
accompanying § 1415(i)(3)(B). 327 Both houses orally agreed to the
report without objection.328 It is at this point that Justice Breyer
points out that while no one objected to the Report, one could still
conclude that silence is significant given the fact that majority of
members who spoke that day had already signed the report. 329 From
its history, Justice Breyer attempts to show that Congress adopted
both the proposed text of the IDEA and the accompanying report.330
Thus, the report, in a sense, explains Congress' intended meaning of
the textual language of the Act.33' Since the Report's text clearly
allows for an award of expert fees, Justice Breyer contended that
Congress intended for the IDEA to authorize such an award.332
b). The Purpose of the IDEA Supports an Award of Expert Fees
321. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-112, at 15-16
(1985)) (internal quotes omitted).
323. 131 CONG. REC. 21390.
324. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. 2455 at 2467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
325. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
326. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
327. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
328. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
329. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer is making this comment in
response to Justice Ginsburg's contention that the silence of the sponsors of the
legislation as to expert fees in some way indicated that they did not intend the
amendment to authorize such an award under the IDEA.
330. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
331. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
332. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Justice Breyer's key concern with the Court's decision is that the
IDEA's goals of ensuring parental participation and quality
procedural protections will be increasingly diminished if parents are
unable to recover expert fees and costs.333 Justice Breyer points out
the increasing need of experts in IDEA litigation and the fact that
"the vast majority of parents whose children require the benefits and
protections provided in the IDEA lack the knowledge about the
educational resources available to their child and the sophistication to
mount an effective case against a district-proposed IEP. 334
Further, Justice Breyer notes the high cost of experts and the
likely problem that many parents will just not be able to afford an
expert without the potential for reimbursement.335 Unlike their
school district counterparts, parents do not staff experts that can later
be used during IDEA litigation.336 In effect, Justice Breyer is saying
that an individual's right to a free appropriate public education will
mean nothing to that individual if he or she has to pay hundreds of
dollars to receive it.
337
To support his argument, Justice Breyer points out that the Court
has previously avoided interpretations that would cause a ghastly
result.338 Specifically, Justice Breyer turns to the Court's holding in
Florence County School District Four v. Carter. In Carter, the Court
held that "prevailing parents are not barred from reimbursement for
switching their child to a private school that does not meet the
IDEA's definition of a free and appropriate education." 339 The Court
overlooked a small detail with respect to the IDEA in order to ensure
that its overarching purpose was maintained.34 ° Justice Breyer
strongly believes that the Court's interpretation of the word "costs"
will defeat the primary purpose of the IDEA.34 1 And, in the words of
Justice Breyer, the Court's decision "will leave many parents . . .
333. Id. at 2469 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
334. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
336. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
337. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
338. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 2470 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Florence County Sch. Dist.
Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993)).
340. Carter, 510 U.S. at 13-14.
341. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2470 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition, a far
cry from the level playing field that Congress envisioned." '342
2. Justice Breyer's Critique of the Majority
To conclude his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer gives an in-
depth critique of the majority decision with respect to all three of its
arguments. Justice Breyer first attacks the Court's Spending Clause
analysis. While he agrees with the majority that the IDEA, on its
face, does not clearly indicate that States must pay for expert fees,
Justice Breyer does not believe that the majority has taken the correct
approach.3 43 According to Justice Breyer, the Court has gone too far
with its strict and narrowly interpreted clear notice requirement. 344
He points out that Pennhurst does not require that every detail of
Spending Clause legislation be spelled out with striking clarity. 345
Justice Breyer argues that this case involves but a detail of an
extensive piece of legislation, and requiring overtly detailed clarity
here, when such clarity was never required in several other IDEA
cases decided by the Court346, is overreaching. 347  In fact, Justice
Breyer points out that in many cases where the Court examined
financial burdens imposed by the IDEA, it never even referenced the
Spending Clause or the clear notice requirement.348 In all, Justice
Breyer is most concerned with the Court's strict requirement of
textual clarity because of its potential to circumvent the objectives of
complex federal programs. 349
342. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 536).
343. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
344. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
345. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
346. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359,
369 (1985) (providing for parental reimbursement for private school fees); see also
Cedar Rapids Comm, Sch. Dist. v, Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 76-79 (1999) (requiring
school to provide child with continuous nursing services).
347. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
348. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369 (providing for parental reimbursement
for private school fees); see also Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 76-79 (requiring school
to provide child with continuous nursing services).
349. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2471 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Placing the Ball in Congress' CourtFall 2007
596 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
Next, Justice Breyer attacks the Court's reliance on statutory
interpretation. He sees the Court's interpretation of § 1415(i)(3)(B)
as plausible, but not the only plausible construction. 350 Justice
Breyer argues that one could reasonably read the statute as containing
the general authority to award costs, coupled with an express
inclusion of attorneys' fees as one of the potential cost awards.35'
Under this construction, the statute would not exclude an award of
expert fees. Even though Justice Breyer's construction is
grammatically more challenging than the Court's, he contends it is
legislatively more likely.352  Specifically, under the Court's
interpretation, the attorney's fees provision of the IDEA is subject to
§ 1920; yet, § 1920 only applies in federal court.35 3 This produces a
somewhat odd result in that all IDEA actions are initiated in state due
process hearings.354 Then, parents who choose to appeal may do so
in either state or federal court.355 Section 1920 would not apply to
these due process hearings or the appeals brought in state courts. 35 6
Under the Court's interpretation, the scope of the term "costs" would
vary from state to state and from proceeding to proceeding. 357 Thus,
Justice Breyer disagrees with the Court's determination that §
1415(i)(3)(B) is unambiguous; rather, he concludes that because
there are two plausible interpretations of the provision, the Court
should have looked to legislative intent and the overriding purpose of
the IDEA in interpreting the attorney's fees provision in question.
Finally, Justice Breyer critiques the Court's decision to categorize
the term "costs" as it is used in the IDEA as a term of art whose
scope traditionally excludes expert fees.358 Justice Breyer disagrees
with this categorization and rests his argument on the study
conducted by the GAO.359 Justice Breyer first points out that the
language of the provision directing the GAO to conduct this study
350. Id. at 2472 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
351. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
352. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
353. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
354. Id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
355. Id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
356. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
357. Id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
358. Id at 2473 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
359. Id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
used both the word "costs" and "expenses." 360 Justice Breyer raises
the question: if Congress wanted to limit the award of costs to only
those enumerated in § 1920, why did Congress use the word
"expenses" as part of the amount awarded to the prevailing party?361
He goes on to point out that, when used as a term of art, the term
"costs" and § 1920 do not cover any expenses.362 So, the question
remains, why include expenses in the provision if "costs" is a term of
art intended to exclude an award of expert fees? 36 3
Justice Breyer criticizes the Court's speculation as to why the
GAO study required data to be collected with respect to expert costs
and fees. 364 He concludes his dissent by pleading to the Court that
the study is at least some indication that Congress did not intend the
word "costs" to be a term of art, as it was in Crawford Fitting and
Casey.365  According to Justice Breyer, if this is the case then
precedent would not prevent the Court from turning to the legislative
history of § 1415(i)(3)(B) for help in interpreting the provision.366
And thus, as previously stated by Justice Breyer, "[the legislative]
history could not be more clear about the matter: Congress intended
the statutory phrase 'attorneys' fees as part of the costs' to include
the costs of experts. ,367
Ultimately, Justice Breyer is most disappointed with the Court's
failure to truly consider the IDEA's legislative history.368 According
to Justice Breyer, the most important judicial goal is to interpret with
respect to a statute's purpose.3 69 In his opinion, the Court's failure in
this regard has led to an interpretation that undercuts the purposes of
the IDEA, and one that Congress neither expected nor wanted.370
360. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
361. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
362. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
363. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
364. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
365. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
366. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
367. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
368. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
369. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Finally, he fears that the Court's course of action in this case has
"divorce[d] law from life. 371
V. IMPACT
A. The Practical Implications of Requiring Clear Notice
The most obvious impact of the Court's decision is expressed in
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion. Like in Smith, the Court has
once again placed the ball in Congress' court to reevaluate the
statutory language of the IDEA. Specifically with regard to expert
fees, Congress will have to decide whether it really intended the
IDEA to authorize an award of expert fees to prevailing parents.
Congress' decision to amend the IDEA to include an award of expert
fees would, in effect, affirm the Dissent's interpretation of §
1415(i)(3)(B). On the other hand, Congress' failure to amend the
provision in question would affirm the Court's interpretation that the
IDEA does not authorize an award of expert fees. In reality, it is
solely within Congress' discretion to decide whether the Court's
ruling in Arlington will be overruled.
Another implication of the Court's reliance on the Spending
Clause is the potential effect of the Court's strict interpretation of the
clear notice requirement on other IDEA provisions and other
Spending Clause legislation, in general. The IDEA is a complex and
expansive piece of federal legislation. As a result, many of the
provisions in the IDEA are unclear or ambiguous. To help clarify
provisions in the IDEA a Code of Federal Regulations is published to
accompany the most recent IDEA amendment,372 but even these
Regulations can fall short of total clarity. As Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion points out, the Court's overt attention to
provisions in the IDEA that are no more than details could cause
unanticipated problems. How detailed is Congress going to have to
be? And, if the Court continues to construe Pennhurst's clear notice
requirement strictly, just how many times is Congress going to have
to amend its Spending Clause legislation? It seems that Arlington
gave the Court the perfect opportunity to find clear notice in the
371. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
372. 34 C.F.R. § 300.500 et seq.
IDEA's legislative history, yet the Court chose to extend its
reasoning in Pennhurst. The Court's extension of the Pennhurst
clear notice requirement has the potential to create enormous
inflexibility in the Court's interpretation of spending clause
legislation and could potentially force Congress into amending large
and expansive legislation similar to the IDEA.
B. The Rise of the Independent Education
Evaluation as a Litigation Tool
Unfortunately without the opportunity to recover expert fees
parents are at a natural disadvantage to school districts that generally
staff their own experts. In spite of the Court's holding, parents of
children with disabilities may still gain access to experts via another
IDEA procedural safeguard known as the Independent Education
Evaluation ("IEE").373 Specifically, under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)
("§ 1415(b)(1)"), the IDEA guarantees parents the opportunity to
obtain an independent evaluation of their child at public expense.
3 74
The Code of Federal Regulations clarifies § 1415(b)(1) and provides:
"a parent has to right to an [IEE] at public expense if the parent
disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency." 375  A
parent may request an IEE any time he or she disagrees with an
evaluation. 376  When the parent does request an IEE, the school
district has only two options: (1) to agree to provide the lEE or (2) to
file a due process complaint against the parents, explaining why the
school district's evaluation is adequate. 377 Importantly, a school
district cannot just refuse a parent's lEE request.378 According to the
Court in Schaffer, "[the] IDEA . . . ensures parents' access to an
expert who can evaluate all the materials that the school must make
available, and who can give an independent opinion. They are not
left to challenge the government without a realistic opportunity to
access the necessary evidence, or without an expert with the
373. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).
374. Id
375. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1) (2006).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 55 (2005).
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firepower to match the opposition.'"3 79 While parents are given the
opportunity to access experts outside the influence of a school
district, the experts obtained through an IEE are, by definition,
independent. In reality, independent experts are very different than
those retained by a party in preparation of litigation.
First, it is unlikely that the independent evaluator will act as one
would expect a retained expert to act. It is unlikely that the
independent evaluator will help parents understand evidence or
prepare to challenge the school district's experts. Also, there is no
guarantee that this independent evaluator will testify at the due
process hearing, and no guarantee that he will do so at public
expense. 380 If provided, the IEE guarantees nothing more than an
independent evaluation and the accompanying report.381
Second, there is no absolute guarantee that parents will receive an
IEE at public expense.382 School districts have the option of denying
the parents request for an IEE if they believe their evaluations are
adequate. 383 School districts can opt to take the parents to hearings,
where the school district will have to show the adequacy of its
evaluation and the parents will have to show why an IEE is
necessary.384 Unfortunately, "the vast majority of parents whose
children require the benefits and protections provided in the IDEA
lack knowledge about the educational resources available to their
child and the sophistication to mount an effective case against a
[district refusal to provide an IEE]."385 Thus, the parents who need
an expert the most will likely be unable to obtain one, and in effect,
the level playing field imagined by Congress is now increasingly
uneven.
Even though the IEE provision allows for parents to obtain an
expert in most situations, it still fails to empower parents the same
way a hired expert would. Unfortunately, as a result of the Court's
decision in Arlington, those parents who cannot afford to retain their
379. Id. at 6-61 (emphasis added).





385. Schaffer, 377 F.3d at 458 (Luttig, J., dissenting)).
own expert may never be able to match the firepower of a school
district's staffed and experienced expert. Further, parents relying on
the lEE process to furnish their expert will have to prepare earlier for
litigation.
Requiring parents to better prepare themselves before initiating
litigation has its pros and cons. On the one hand, parents will be
forced to slow down and utilize negotiation and settlement
techniques. Conversely, parents may also need to seek attorneys
earlier in the litigation process, thus, increasing the total amount of
attorneys' fees incurred during the resolution process. This also has
the potential to leave parents with the responsibility of paying their
own attorney's fees. As mentioned above, § 1415(i)(3)(B) only
awards attorneys fees to prevailing parents. Thus, parents who are
able to resolve their issues before proceedings are formally initiated
will most likely never recover attorneys' fees. In effect, while the
IEE provides an alternative for parents unable to afford an expert,
there is no compensation for the loss of parental fire power sustained
as a result of the Court's decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Special Education Law has undergone an enormous
transformation since the days of institutions and forced sterilizations.
There have always been bumps along the road and the Court's
decision in Arlington is no exception. Despite legislative history to
the contrary, the Court in Arlington held that § 1415(i)(3)(B), the
IDEA's attorney's fees provision does not authorize an award of
expert fees to prevailing parents.3 86 As a result, both the parents of
children with disabilities and Congress will have to take a step back
and consider the impact of the Court's decision. For parents, it
means better preparation and better utilization of other IDEA
procedural safeguard provisions. The real pressure, however, has
been placed on Congress. With its decision, the Court has effectively
placed the ball in Congress' court. It is now up to Congress to decide
whether the IDEA should authorize an award of attorney's fees to
prevailing parents. Until then, parents are left with potentially less
386. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. 2455.
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effective means to ensure that children with disabilities receive a free
and appropriate public education.
